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POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
SURVIVORS’ BENEFITS 
 
Kelsey Brown* 
 
Imagine this scenario: a recently married couple learned that 
the husband has a serious form of cancer, and it is extremely likely he 
would be rendered sterile from chemotherapy. The couple, wishing to 
eventually have children, decided to deposit and freeze the husband’s 
sperm before his aggressive treatment begins.  Surprisingly, the couple 
was able to conceive a son naturally while the husband completed his 
chemotherapy.  Unfortunately, the husband passed away before the 
couple could conceive any more children.  After the husband’s death, 
the wife decided to use the husband’s frozen sperm to conceive 
another child, as they had always planned.  The wife was able to 
conceive a set of twins through artificial insemination, and she applied 
for Social Security Survivors’ Benefits for all three children.  The 
wife’s application for the twins was denied because the state where the 
husband was domiciled at the time of his death did not recognize 
posthumously conceived children under its intestacy statutes.  This 
created a situation in which only one of the husband’s three genetic 
children from his legal marriage was able to receive survivors’ 
benefits.  Is it fair that only one of a couple’s three genetic children 
was recognized by the state as deserving to receive Social Security 
survivors’ benefits?  
The above scenario is based on the factual background of the 
recent Supreme Court case Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C.
1
 
Posthumously conceived children
2
 raise a number of questions relating 
to paternity.
3
 The Supreme Court’s decision created even more 
ambiguity when it granted deference to the Social Security 
Administration’s (“the Agency”) reliance on individual states’ 
definition of “child”.4  While the decision in Astrue v. Capato ex rel. 
B.N.C. is now controlling precedent, it creates an extremely 
                                                        
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School 
of Law. A special thank you to Professor Paula A. Monopoli for serving as the 
faculty advisor on this article, and for being a significantly important resource in the 
research and writing process. 
1
 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).  
2
 Children conceived after the death of one parent. MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 970 (11th ed. 2003). 
3
 Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
899, 910 (2012).  
4
 Capato, 132 S.Ct. at 2026.   
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complicated policy issue with regard to how posthumously conceived 
children are defined for Social Security survivors’ benefits.5 
 
I.  CASE LAW ON POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
6
 
 
 In order to fully appreciate the policy nightmare created by the 
Capato decision, we must first examine the case law regarding 
posthumously conceived children and survivors’ benefits.  To date, 
there is no consensus among the states as to how to classify 
posthumously conceived children, or how to determine legal 
paternity.
7
  Since there is a lack of consistency among the states, the 
eligibility of survivors’ benefits varies from state to state, even though 
Social Security is a federal benefit.  
Prior to the decision in Astrue v. Capato,
8
 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart used a different 
approach to determine the eligibility of posthumously conceived 
children.
9
 The Gillett-Netting court found that posthumously 
conceived children were eligible for survivors’ benefits, if their 
biological paternity was not in dispute.
10
  
Robert Netting was diagnosed with cancer in 1994 and was 
informed the chemotherapy treatments would likely render him 
sterile.
11
 Robert decided to store and freeze his sperm, for his wife’s 
later use, at the University of Arizona Health Science Center before he 
began the chemotherapy treatments.
12
 Robert passed away in February 
1995, but prior to his death, he confirmed that he wished his wife to 
have their child with the use of his frozen sperm.
13
 Through the 
process of in-vitro fertilization, Rhonda Gillett-Nettling was able to 
                                                        
5
 Id. 
6
 See generally Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete 
Donor Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 
291 (2013) for a discussion on legal issues regarding surrogacy, which are beyond 
the scope of this article.   
7
 Knaplund, supra note 6, at 917–19. See also Jeffrey A. Parness, Old-Fashioned 
Pregnancy, Newly-Fashioned Paternity, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 57, 60–1 (2003) 
(defining the terms “legal paternity”). 
8
 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
9
 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir.
 
2004), abrogated by Astrue 
v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
10
 Id.  
11
 Id. at 594.  
12
 Id. 
13
 Id. at 594–95.  
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conceive and give birth to twins in August 1996.
14
 Rhonda applied for 
survivors’ benefits on behalf of the twins based on Robert’s earnings 
at the time of his death, but her application was denied by Social 
Security.
15
  
The Ninth Circuit examined the case and determined that the 
twins were entitled to survivors’ benefits.16 The court referred to 42 
U.S.C. section 416(3) and stated that under the Act, every child that is 
a child of a claimant is entitled to benefits.
17
 The court found that since 
the biological paternity of the children was not in dispute, then they 
were dependents of Robert and were entitled to benefits.
18
 The court 
further stated that the provisions set forth in the Social Security Act 
about the different ways to define a child, were only relevant when the 
biological paternity of the child was disputed or when the parents were 
unmarried.
19
  
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its analysis of the rights of 
posthumously conceived children to have survivors’ benefits in 
Vernoff v. Astrue.
20
 The court stated that for a claimant to receive 
benefits, the claimant must show that “(1) he or she is a ‘child,’ under 
the Act; and (2) he or she ‘was dependent on the insured wage earner 
at the time of his death.”21 The court also re-established its reading of 
the word “child” to include “the natural, or biological, child of the 
insured.”22 
                                                        
14
 Id. at 595. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. at 596. 
17
 Id. (citing SOC. SEC. ACT § 216(e)).  
18
 Id. (holding that “Juliet and Piers are Netting’s legitimate children . . . are 
considered to have been dependent under the Act and are entitled to benefits.”). 
19
 Id. at 596–97. The Court noted that:  
[t]hese sections were added to the Act to provide various ways in which 
children could be entitled to benefits even if their parents were not married 
or their parentage was in dispute. They have no relevance to the issue 
before us. As the Fourth Circuit explained ‘[a]n illegitimate claimant may 
establish that he is a ‘child’ for eligibility purposes under either of three 
critical provisions of the Act’ in § 416(h). 
 Id. (quoting McMillian by McMillian v. Heckler, 759 F.2d 1147, 1150 (4th Cir. 
1985) (emphasis added). 
20
 568 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597). 
21
 Id. at 1105 (citing Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596). 
22
 Id. (citing Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596). 
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals split from the position 
taken by the Ninth Circuit in the case of Schafer v. Astrue.
23
 Don and 
Janice Schafer married in 1992, and a few months later Don was 
diagnosed with cancer.
24
 Don deposited and froze his sperm in 
December 1992 because his cancer treatments were likely to leave him 
sterile.
25
 Janice Schafer used the frozen sperm, after her husband’s 
death, to conceive a child, W.M.S., in 1999.
26
 The court noted that 
while the child was born seven years after Don’s death, there was very 
strong evidence that W.M.S. was Don’s biological offspring.27 The 
facts also stated that there was evidence that Don intended for Janice 
to have their child with his sperm, but this consent was not in writing 
nor did it refer to Don’s intent to be the legal parent of the child.28 In 
2004, Janice applied for survivors’ benefits on behalf of W.M.S. and 
was originally awarded the benefits by an Administrative Law Judge.
29
 
However, the Agency’s Appeals Council reversed the Administrative 
Law Judge’s decision and determined that W.M.S. was not Don’s 
child within the Agency’s definition and that the child was not eligible 
to inherit under Virginia intestacy laws.
30
  
The Fourth Circuit differed from the Ninth Circuit by 
determining that the Agency’s reading of the Act should be granted 
Chevron deference.
31
 The Fourth Circuit noted that Congress set forth 
specific instructions for the Agency, which state, “the Secretary shall 
apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of 
intestate personal property . . . .” 32  The court analyzed Virginia 
                                                        
23
 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011). 
24
 Id. at 51. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. (“There is also evidence that Don intended for Janice to use the stored semen to 
conceive a child after his anticipated death, though he never expressed consent in 
writing to be the legal father of a child resulting from post–humous in vitro 
fertilization.”).  
29
 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. at 54. See explanation of Chevron Deference infra Part II. 
32
 Id. (“In so doing, they have overlooked Congress's plain and explicit instruction on 
how the determination of child status should be made: ‘In determining whether an 
applicant is the child . . . of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of 
this subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in 
determining the devolution of intestate personal property . . . .’ (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
416(h)(2)(A)”)). 
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intestacy laws to determine W.M.S.’s eligibility to inherit in the 
state.
33
 Virginia laws state that a child must be born within ten months 
of the decedent’s death to be eligible to inherit property from the 
estate.
34
 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the child was not 
eligible to receive Social Security survivors’ benefits.35 
The case of Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security
36
 
presented the issue of posthumously conceived children receiving 
benefits and inheriting to the Massachusetts courts for the first time.
37
 
Lauren Woodward appealed the denial of her application for 
survivors’ benefits to the United States District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts on behalf of her twin daughters.
38
 Lauren was 
married to Warren Woodward for approximately three years, when he 
was diagnosed with leukemia in 1993.
39
 Warren had his semen 
medically removed and preserved because the treatment for his 
leukemia would likely leave him sterile.
40
 In October of 1993, Warren 
passed away while domiciled in Massachusetts, and Lauren gave birth 
to twin girls through artificial insemination in October 1995.
41
  
The United States District Court presented a certified question 
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts regarding the 
interpretation of the state’s law. 42  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts was presented with the following certified question to 
determine in the case: 
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be 
withdrawn from the husband for the purpose of artificially 
impregnating the wife, and the woman is impregnated with that 
sperm after the man, her husband, has died, will children 
resulting from such pregnancy enjoy the inheritance rights of 
                                                        
33
 Id. at 53. 
34
 Id. (“But Virginia law does not recognize any ‘child born more than ten months 
after the death of a parent’ as that parent's child for intestacy purposes.” (citing VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-164 (amended 2012))). 
35
 Id. at 63 (holding that “[w]hile modern medicine allowed Janice Schafer to 
partially fulfill some of those plans years later, Virginia intestacy law, as 
incorporated by the Act, does render survivorship benefits unavailable here”). 
36
 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
37
  Id. at 261. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 260. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. at 261. 
Brown    
262  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 13:2 
 
 
natural children under Massachusetts' law of intestate 
succession?
43
 
 
The court noted that the state’s intestacy laws were not specific 
to posthumously conceived children.
44
 The Massachusetts laws 
regarding inheritance state that if a decedent “leaves issue,” then such 
issue shall inherit the decedent’s property. 45  The court ultimately 
determined that posthumously conceived children could inherit as 
issue under Massachusetts’s intestacy law, but under limited 
circumstances.
46
 
 The court determined that there were three main considerations 
to limit the circumstances under which a posthumously conceived 
child could inherit.
47
 The genetic relationship between the decedent 
and the posthumously conceived child must be established.
48
 It must 
also be established that the decedent both consented to conception of 
the child and intended to support the child.
49
 The court also noted that 
there may be a time limitation that could prevent a posthumously 
conceived child from inheriting under the state’s intestacy statutes.50 
 Thus, states differ in how they handle posthumously conceived 
children and Social Security survivors’ benefits. This patchwork of 
state laws and regulations potentially allows for posthumously 
conceived children to be denied benefits that they are entitled to as 
natural born children of a decedent. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                        
43
 Id. at 259. 
44
 Id. at 264. 
45
 Id. at 263 (“Section 1 of the intestacy statute directs that, if a decedent ‘leaves 
issue,’ such ‘issue’ will inherit a fixed portion of his real and personal property, 
subject to debts and expenses, the rights of the surviving spouse, and other statutory 
payments not relevant here.”). 
46
 Id. at 259 (“We answer the certified question as follows: In certain limited 
circumstances, a child resulting from posthumous reproduction may enjoy the 
inheritance rights of ‘issue’ under the Massachusetts intestacy statute.”). 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. (“[T]he surviving parent or the child's other legal representative demonstrates a 
genetic relationship between the child and the decedent.”). 
49
 Id. (“The survivor or representative must then establish both that the decedent 
affirmatively consented to posthumous conception and to the support of any 
resulting child.”). 
50
 Id. (“Even where such circumstances exist, time limitations may preclude 
commencing a claim for succession rights on behalf of a posthumously conceived 
child.”). 
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Astrue v. Capato, did not remedy the disparities between the states’ 
laws.  
 
II. ASTRUE V. CAPATO 
 
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C.
51
 is a case involving a mother 
trying to obtain Social Security survivors’ benefits for her twins.52 
Karen and Robert Capato were married in May 1999.
53
 Robert Capato 
was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and was informed that he might 
be rendered sterile from the chemotherapy treatments.
54
 The couple 
wished to have children, so Robert deposited and froze his sperm 
before starting chemotherapy.
55
 Karen was able to conceive a son 
naturally in August 2001, despite the chemotherapy.
56
 
In March 2002, Robert passed away from the cancer while 
living in Florida.
57
 His will named his son with Karen and two 
children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries.
58
 While the 
Capatos told their attorney they wished for future children “to be 
placed on a par with existing children,”59 they made no provisions in 
their will for future offspring.  In January 2003, Karen conceived with 
the frozen sperm through artificial insemination and gave birth to 
twins in September 2003.
60
 The children were born eighteen months 
after Robert Capato’s death.61 
On behalf of her twins, Karen claimed Social Security 
survivors’ benefits. 62  Social Security survivors’ benefits, including 
child’s insurance benefits, are part of the protective family measures 
Congress added to the Social Security Act in a 1939 amendment.
63
 
The amendment provided a monthly benefit for a designated surviving 
                                                        
51
 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
52
 Id. at 2026. 
53
 Id.  
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012); Social Security Act 
of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1–2566. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 402 (2006)).  
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family member of a deceased insured wage earner.
64
 A child applicant 
is eligible for these benefits, if they fit into the act’s definition of a 
“child” and meet other requirements regarding age, dependency, and 
marital status.
65
  
The Social Security Administration denied the application for 
the survivors’ benefits. 66  The United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey reviewed the denial and determined that the 
Agency decision was correct.
67
 The court determined that under the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 416(h)(2)(A)
68
, children could 
only receive survivors’ benefits if they could inherit under the state 
intestacy laws.
69
 Robert Capato was domiciled in Florida at the time of 
his death and his will was executed in Florida.
70
 Florida intestacy laws 
state that children born posthumously can only inherit if they were 
conceived during the decedent’s lifetime. 71  Another Florida statute 
further states that posthumously conceived children are not eligible to 
inherit property unless there is a provision for them in the decedent’s 
will.
72
 Therefore, the District Court determined that the denial of 
benefits was proper because the Capato twins could not inherit under 
Florida intestacy laws.
73
  
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District 
Court’s decision on the survivors’ benefits.74 The Court of Appeals 
based the reversal on its reading of Social Security Act section 416(e), 
and found that “‘the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage 
                                                        
64
 53 Stat. 1363–65. 
65
 Id. at 1364. 
66
 Capato v. Astrue, No. 08–5405, 2010 WL 1076522, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2010). 
67
 Capato, 2010 WL 1076522, at *9. 
68
 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006) (“In determining whether an applicant is the 
child or parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this 
subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be 
applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of 
the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant 
files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in 
which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured individual is or 
was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of Columbia. 
Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking 
intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.”) 
69
 Capato, 2010 WL 1076522, at *5. 
70
 Id. at *6. 
71
 Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West 1997). 
72
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 1993); Capato, 2010 WL 1076522, at *5. 
73
 Capato, 2010 WL 1076522, at *9.  
74
 Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 632 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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earner and his widow’ qualify for survivors benefits without regard to 
state intestacy law.”75  
 The Supreme Court’s analysis focused on how Congress had 
defined the word “child” within the Social Security Act.76  The Court 
noted that Congress amended the Act in 1939 to allow for survivors’ 
benefits, including “child’s insurance benefits.”77 The Act has three 
categories for who is eligible to qualify as a “child” for insurance 
benefits: “The term ‘child’ means (1) the child or legally adopted child 
of an individual, (2) a stepchild [under certain circumstances], and (3) 
. . . the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse 
[who meets certain conditions].”78  
In order to determine if the Capato twins qualified as children 
under the Act, the Court looked again to the statutory provisions of the 
Social Security Act for a more expansive definition of a child.
79
  The 
Court interpreted the Agency’s statutory reading of section 416(h) as 
governing the meaning of the term “child” in section 416(e).80  The 
Court agreed with the Agency that section 416(h) requires that a child 
inherit under state intestacy laws to be eligible to receive survivors’ 
benefits.
81
 The Court explained that the state intestacy laws serve as a 
“gateway” for children to obtain survivors’ benefits.82  
The Court did note that the Social Security Act does have an 
alternative path for those children who do not qualify under state 
intestacy laws.
83
 The Social Security Act provides four additional 
conditions for which a child could qualify for benefits as a “natural 
child.” 84  The Supreme Court finally decided, after analyzing the 
                                                        
75
 Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012) (quoting Capato, 
631 F.3d 626, 632 (2011)). 
76
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006). 
79
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028. 
80
 Id. at 2029. 
81
 Id. at 2026. 
82
 Id. at 2029. 
83
Id. at 2028–29.  
84
 Id. (“They state that an applicant may qualify for insurance benefits as a “natural 
child” by meeting any of four conditions: (1) the applicant ‘could inherit the 
insured's personal property as his or her natural child under State inheritance laws’; 
(2) the applicant is ‘the insured's natural child and [his or her parents] went through a 
ceremony which would have resulted in a valid marriage between them except for a 
legal impediment’; (3) before death, the insured acknowledged in writing his or her 
parentage of the applicant, was decreed by a court to be the applicant's parent, or 
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Agency’s statutes, as well as the notes and comments process,85 that 
the Agency’s interpretation of the provisions was reasonable.86  Since 
the interpretation was reasonable, the Court decided the Social 
Security’s reading should be granted “Chevron deference.”87  
Chevron deference requires that the meaning of the statute in 
question be ambiguous and that an agency’s interpretation of the 
ambiguity be reasonable.
88
 In this case, the term child was ambiguous 
in the statute, but the Court found that the Agency’s reliance on the 
entire definition of a child in the Act and referring to state intestacy 
laws was a reasonable interpretation of the term child.
89
  The Court 
held that the denial of the insurance benefits was correct and reversed 
the decision of the Appellate Court.
90
 
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ASTRUE V. CAPATO 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision and its application of Chevron 
deference were legally correct. Yet sometimes the legally correct 
decision is nonetheless unsatisfactory.  The Chevron deference test is 
used by courts to determine if deference should be granted to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own statute.91  The court defers to the 
agency’s interpretation when: (1) it determined that the statute is 
                                                                                                                                  
was ordered by a court to contribute to the applicant's support; or (4) other evidence 
shows that the insured is the applicant's ‘natural father or mother’ and was either 
living with, or contributing to the support of, the applicant.”).  
85
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028. 
86
 Id. at 2033. 
87
 Id. at 2033–34. (“Chevron deference is appropriate ‘when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, 
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.’”). 
88
 Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781–82  (1984). 
89
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (“[T]he SSA's reading is better attuned to the statute's 
text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner 
in his or her lifetime. And even if the SSA's longstanding interpretation is not the 
only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction that garners the Court's 
respect under [Chevron]); see also Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033 (“The SSA’s 
interpretation of the relevant provisions, adhered to without deviation for many 
decades, is at least reasonable; the agency’s reading is therefore entitled to this 
Court’s deference under Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 
694.”). 
90
 Id. at 2034. 
91
 WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE PROBLEMS 
AND CASES 145 (4th ed. 2010). 
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ambiguous and Congress has not directly spoken on the issue, and (2) 
the court determined that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is 
permissible or reasonable.
92
 
 
A. The Term “Child” is Actually Ambiguous in the Social 
Security Act 
 
In Astrue v. Capato, the question for the Court was whether the 
twins qualified as “children” under the Social Security Act’s 
definitional provisions.
93
  In order to fully understand how the Act 
uses the term “child,” it is important to first consider the original 
purpose of the Social Security Act and survivors’ benefits.  The Act 
was intended to prevent a larger number of Americans from becoming 
dependent on society because they lacked income resources.  The 
Social Security Act was also designed to prevent a mass loss of 
purchasing power by the same group of Americans.
94
 However, before 
the first retirement check was mailed, the Act experienced a 
fundamental change under the 1939 amendments.
95
  The 1939 
amendments are considered to be the “second start” to Social Security, 
by completely transforming the program.
96
  Social Security was 
originally developed as a retirement plan for workers, but the 1939 
amendments restructured the program into a protective “family-based” 
system.
97
  The amendments added benefits for wives, widows, and 
dependent children.
98
  The changes included the creation of 
dependents benefits, and a system of regular-monthly payments of 
survivors’ benefits to replace the one-time death payment system.99  
The goal of the survivors’ benefits was to help secure the family 
against a sudden loss in income due to the wage-earner’s death.100  
                                                        
92
 Id. at 146.  
93
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027. 
94
 Reasons for the 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act, Legislative History, 
1939 Amendments, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/1939no3.html (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2013). 
95
 DeWitt, Larry, Development of Social Security in America, SOCIAL SECURITY 
BULLETIN, Vol. 70, No. 3, 8 (2010). 
96
 Id. at 9.  
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. at 8. 
99
 Id. 
100
 Reasons for the 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act, Legislative History, 
1939 Amendments, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/1939no3.html (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2013). 
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Under the definitional provisions of the Act, section 416, there 
are multiple paths to qualify as a child.
101
  The first statutory definition 
of a qualifying child is section 416(e), which states “[t]he term child 
means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an individual.” 102 
Another section of the Act states that a child must qualify under a 
state’s intestacy laws for the child to qualify for Social Security 
survivors’ benefits. 103   If a child does not qualify under section 
416(h)(2)(A), he or she may qualify under (h)(3)(C) if the deceased 
wage-earner met the threshold requirements for acknowledging the 
child prior to the parent’s death.104  
The guidance for survivors’ benefits seems to set out multiple 
avenues to decide if a biological child
105
 qualifies for benefits.  In 
Astrue v. Capato, each side, and the different courts, interpreted the 
statutory term child differently in applying the requirements to the 
twins.
106
  The Capato family and the Court of Appeals argued that 
section 416(e) was the proper interpretation of when a biological child 
qualified for survivors’ benefits.107  The Court of Appeals held that 
section 416(e)(1) means a biological child of the deceased wage-
earner “undisputedly” qualified for the benefits. 108   However, the 
Agency and the District Court found that section 416(h)(2)(A) was the 
                                                        
101
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028–29. 
102
 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) (2006). 
103
 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006). 
104
 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C) (2006) (stating that “in the case of a deceased 
individual–   
(i) such insured individual –  
(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his or her son 
or daughter,  
(II) had been decreed by a court to be the mother or father of the 
applicant, or  
(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the 
applicant because the applicant was his or her son or daughter,  
                             and such acknowledgment, court decree, or court order was made      
before the death of such insured individual, or  
(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the 
Commissioner of Social Security to have been the mother or father of the applicant, 
and such insured individual was living with or contributing to the support of the 
applicant at the time such insured individual died.”). 
105
 42 U.S.C. § 416(k) (2006). 
106
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026–27; see nn.57–61 and accompanying text. 
107
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2029. 
108
 Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 632 (3d. Cir. 2011).. 
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proper definition of the term child.
109
  Under section 416(h)(2)(A), the 
Capato twins were ineligible for benefits because they would not 
inherit under Florida’s intestacy laws.110  The Agency argued that the 
twins failed to meet the alternative statutory requirements under 
section 416(h)(3)(C) because the decedent did not acknowledge them 
prior to his death.
111
  The various interpretations of the term child 
show that the statute was ambiguous, satisfying the first step of the 
Chevron analysis. The Court properly moved to the second step of the 
analysis.
112
  
 
B. The Agency’s Interpretation of the Term “Child” was Legally 
Reasonable. 
  
The second step of Chevron deference requires a court to 
determine if an agency’s interpretation of the ambiguity is 
reasonable.
113
  In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court focused its 
analysis on 42 U.S.C. section 416(e) and section 416(h)(2)(A).
114
  
Ultimately the Court determined that the Social Security’s 
interpretation was reasonable because 42 U.S.C. section 416(h)(2)(A) 
serves as a “gateway” for all children to qualify for benefits.115  
 The Social Security Act provides in section 402(d) that 
“[e]very child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title)’of a deceased 
insured individual ‘shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit.”116  
The term child in section 416(e) provides for three categories of 
eligible children: “(1) the child or legally adopted child of an 
individual, (2) a stepchild [under certain circumstances], and (3) . . .  
the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse [who 
meets certain conditions].”117 The Agency interpreted the categories of 
children in section 416(e) as being governed by section 416(h), which 
                                                        
109
 Capato v. Astrue, No. 08–5405, 2010 WL 1076522, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2010) 
110
 Id. 
111
 Id.  
112
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033. 
113
 Funk et al., supra note 94, at 146.. 
114
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2029–30. 
115
  Id. at 2029.  
116
 Id. at 2027; see also 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2006). 
117
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027. 
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is a perquisite that all eligible children need to meet to establish status 
as a “natural child.”118  
 The Agency’s interpretation relied heavily on the language of 
section 416(h)(2)(A) as an expansion of the definition of a child from 
section 416(e).
119
 The Agency argued that the language of the section 
provides clear instructions for determining the eligibility of a child: 
“In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . for the purposes 
of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply 
such law[s] . . . if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the 
State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death . . . .”120  The 
Agency stated that the Act provides alternative paths for a child to 
qualify for benefits, if the child does not meet the intestacy 
prerequisite of section 416(h)(2)(A).
121
  Furthermore, the regulations 
provide that a natural child may qualify for benefits, if the child meets 
one of four conditions.
122
  The Agency found, based on its statutory 
interpretation of section 416(h)(2)(A) and the regulations, that a 
biological child must meet certain requirements to qualify for 
benefits.
123
 
 The Supreme Court found the Agency’s interpretation 
reasonable based on statutory construction and the history of the 
Social Security Act.
124
  The statutory construction of section 416(e), 
according to the Court, supports the interpretation that section 
416(h)(2)(A) provides the definition of a qualifying child.
125
  As 
previously stated, section 416(e) provides the three categories of 
children that qualify to receive survivors’ benefits.126  However, the 
Court points out a distinction in the categories that is crucial to the 
Agency’s argument.127  The statutory categories for stepchildren and 
grandchild specify that these children are eligible under certain 
                                                        
118
 Id. at 2029 (“The regulations make clear that the SSA interprets the Act to meant 
that the provisions of § 416(h) are the exclusive means by which an applicant can 
establish ‘child’ status under § 416(e) as a natural child.”). 
119
 Id. at 2028. 
120
 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006). 
121
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) (2006); § 
416(h)(3)(C) (2006). 
122
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028.  
123
 Id. at 2029. 
124
 Id. at 2033. 
125
 Id.  
126
 Id. 
127
 Id. at 2027–28. 
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circumstances, while the category for natural children only states a 
“child . . . or legally adopted child . . . .”128 The Court argued that 
section 416(e)(1) lacked specific conditions which means that it is not 
the complete definition and one must look to section 416(h)(2)(A) to 
complete the definition for a qualifying natural child.
129
  
 The Court also looked to the history of the statute to determine 
if the Agency’s reading was reasonable.  The original draft of section 
416(h) stated that it applied, “for purposes of sections 401– 409 of this 
title, the Board shall apply [state intestacy law].”130  The historical 
sections of 401–409, included the statutory predecessors of sections 
402(d) and 416(e), which the Court noted as evidence that the modern 
section 416(h) was intended to be the definitional link to section 
416(e).
131
  The Court further found that the Social Security Act refers 
to state law to determine family status throughout the Act.
132
  
 The Supreme Court appropriately found, based on the statutory 
construction and the history of the Act, that the Agency’s reading of 
the term “child” was reasonable. However, even if it is the appropriate 
and correct legal interpretation, the Supreme Court’s finding is a 
problematic decision for posthumously conceived children. 
 
IV. ASTRUE V. CAPATO IS A PROBLEMATIC DECISION FOR 
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Capato 133  created a 
complicated public policy nightmare. Instead of solving the problem, 
the Court just noted that denial of benefits was unfortunate.
134
 The 
Supreme Court affirmation of the Agency’s interpretation is 
counterintuitive to the purpose of survivors’ benefits because it creates 
an underclass of children who are forced to depend on inconsistent 
state laws to determine if they are eligible for benefits.
135
  
 
                                                        
128
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028–29. 
129
 Id. at 2033. 
130
 Id. at 2031; 42 U.S.C. § 409(m) (1940). 
131
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2031; 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1940); 42 U.S.C. § 409(k) 
(1940). 
132
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2031; see 42 U.S.C. § 416(b), (c), (f), (g), (h)(1)(A) (2006). 
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 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2021. 
134
 Id. at 2034. 
135
 Id. at 2026, 2028–29, 2033–34.   
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A. The Supreme Court’s Decision Ignores the Intention and 
History of Survivors’ Benefits. 
 
Survivors’ benefits were a part of an amendment to the Social 
Security Act in 1939 to provide insurance benefits to dependents and 
surviving spouses of a deceased wage earner with qualified 
earnings.
136
  The goal of the amendment was to help families stay 
together after the death of the wage-earner by providing monthly 
benefits.
137
 With regards to children, the benefits were intended to 
serve as a “family-protective measure,”138 to supplement the loss of 
income from the wage-earner’s death. 139   The history of the Act 
further shows that it has been amended to reflect societal changes.
140
  
Congress has even amended the Act to include other categories of 
children, such as grandchildren, stepchildren, and adopted children.
141
  
However, the Court ignored the Act’s intention and history by refusing 
to protect posthumously conceived children with these family-focused 
benefits. 
The Court’s decision perpetuates the creation of an underclass 
of children, who are discriminated against because of the timing of 
their conception. These children have no alternative path to secure 
benefits they are entitled to as the child of a deceased wage-earner.
142
  
The Court has allowed the statute to remain underinclusive by 
excluding posthumously conceived children.
143
  The idea that these 
children have a path through states’ intestacy laws is also inconsistent 
with the goals of the Social Security Act because there is a wide 
variety among state law regarding posthumously conceived children 
and their rights to inherit.
144
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 Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social 
Security Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 251, 305–06 (1999). 
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 Id. at 311. 
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 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027. 
139
 Banks, supra note 138, at 313. 
140
 Id. at 305–06. 
141
 Id. at 320. 
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 Id. at 346. 
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 Id. 
144
 Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has 
Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and 
How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 362 (2011) (stating three 
categories in which state statutes, in regard to posthumously conceived children, fall 
short: “(1) statutes based on model or uniform codes . . . (2) statutes not based on 
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V. AMENDING THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT: A UNIFORM SOLUTION  
  
The Supreme Court decision in Astrue v. Capato,
145
 stated that 
the deference goes to the Agency’s reading of the statutory 
provision.
146
 This interpretation means that a posthumously conceived 
child can only receive survivors’ benefits, if the child qualifies for 
inheritance under that state’s intestacy laws.147 The combination of the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the Agency’s reading, and the 
inconsistency among the states creates a non-uniform distribution 
system of Social Security survivors’ benefits amongst posthumously 
conceived children.  Posthumously conceived children do not appear 
any different from children conceived during the lives of their parents. 
There are no physical differences that would mark or signal a child as 
being posthumously conceived.  However, the Social Security 
Administration, legislatures, and courts have decided to treat these 
children as a separate class that should not be granted the same rights 
as children conceived through traditional means.  
 The Agency’s interpretation allows states to decide if a 
posthumously conceived child can receive a federal benefit. The lack 
of consistency among the states presents a problem, because in one 
state a posthumously conceived child may receive the benefits from 
Social Security, a federal agency, and yet in another state that same 
child may be denied the benefits.
148
 This non-uniform distribution of 
benefits raises an important question: does applying the Social 
Security Act differently depending on whether a child is born before a 
parent died or after and in which state that child resides violate the 
equal protection rights of a class of individuals who cannot control 
                                                                                                                                  
models or uniform codes and pre-date cryopreservation, and (3) statutes that 
expressly address posthumously conceived children”). 
145
 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2021. 
146
 Id. at 2033. 
147
 Id. at 2029.  
148
 Compare Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 63 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
survivors benefits were not available to the son within the meaning of the act) with 
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir.
 
2004), abrogated by Astrue 
v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) (finding that posthumously 
conceived children were eligible for survivors’ benefits, if their biological paternity 
was not in dispute).  
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their status?
149
 Posthumously conceived children do not choose when 
they are conceived, yet these children are frequently being punished 
solely because of the timing of their conception.   
 
1. An Overhaul of the Current Legal Regime Determining the 
Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children to Receive 
Survivors’ Benefits is Necessary 
  
A new system is needed to appropriately handle the 
administration of Social Security survivors’ benefits to posthumously 
conceived children. A Congressional amendment to the Social 
Security Act including posthumously conceived children in the 
definition of a child would likely be the most comprehensive and 
productive means of creating a new system to include posthumously 
conceived children. Such a provision would clarify the Congressional 
intent related to the issue.
150
 It would also create a uniform system, in 
which all posthumously conceived children would be held to the same 
standards to qualify for survivors’ benefits.  
 However, some have pointed out that there may be problems 
with such an amendment by Congress.
151
 One must take into 
consideration the current climate in Congress and the attitudes towards 
social legislation.
152
 In addition, the current financial state of the 
Agency may hinder Congress’s motivation for creating such a 
provision, which would essentially grant survivor benefits to a larger 
population of children.
153
 Such a provision would need some 
limitation for it to likely gain political approval. An amendment 
modeled after the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) would be sufficient to 
provided legislative regulation over the situation. 
 
 
                                                        
149
 Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012) (The Supreme 
Court found there was “no showing” that posthumously conceived children were 
classified in a manner to raise the level of constitutional scrutiny to be applied under 
the Equal Protection clause of the Unites States Constitution.)  
150
 Banks, supra note 138, at 378 (stating that congressional intent “has shown that 
survivor’s benefits should replace the loss of support an orphaned child would have 
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151
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152
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2. The UPC is the Ideal Prototype for the Necessary 
Amendment 
 
The Uniform Probate Code provides a model for Congress to 
amend the Social Security Act, in favor of posthumously conceived 
children.  Under the UPC, a child, by definition is entitled to take for 
the purposes of intestate succession when there is a parent-child 
relationship.
154
  The UPC contains a provision to determine the parent-
child relationship when artificial reproductive technology is used to 
conceive the child, including posthumously conceived children.
155
  
The provision allows for the parent, other than the birth mother, to be 
treated as the parent of child conceived through artificial reproduction, 
through consent to assist the birth mother in the conception and the 
intent to be a parent to the child.
156
 A signed record can serve as 
evidence of consent and intent to be the parent.
157
  In the absence of a 
written record, the UPC provides three other means to establish 
consent and intent.
158
 In regard to posthumously conceived children, 
the parent-child relationship may be established by showing through 
clear and convincing evidence, that the decedent intended to be treated 
as a parent of a posthumously conceived child.
159
    
The UPC further provides for when a posthumously conceived 
child should be considered in gestation at the time of the decedent’s 
death.
160
  For the purposes of intestate succession, the UPC allows for 
unborn children in gestation at the time of the decedent’s death to be 
considered as living at decedent’s death, if certain criterion is met 
under UPC section 2-104(a)(2).
161
  The child in gestation will be 
considered living at the time of decedent’s death, if the child survives 
120 hours after birth.
162
  The UPC allows for posthumously conceived 
children to be considered living at the time of a decedent’s death, for 
the purposes of section 2-104(a)(2), if they fit into two categories.
163
  
First, a posthumously conceived child must be “in utero no later than 
                                                        
154
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36 months after the individual’s death,” to be considered living for 
intestate purposes.
164
  A posthumously conceived child born within 45 
months of the decedent’s death will also be considered as living at the 
time of decedent’s death for intestacy.165 The expanded time limits for 
posthumously conceived children were designed to provide the 
grieving spouse/partner time to decide to use artificial reproduction, 
and an opportunity to have a successful pregnancy.
166
  Furthermore, 
the 45-month period provides a safety net for cases in which the exact 
“in utero” time is not easily established.167    
 The Uniform Probate Code provides guidelines for creating an 
amendment to the Social Security Act, which protects posthumously 
conceived children and also limits the expansion of the Act.  While 
some might argue that the language of the UPC is too broad, it is a 
uniform set of laws and therefore, eliminates the disparities among the 
states in the treatment of posthumously conceived children.
168
  
Regardless of the language used, there needs to be a change to the 
current regime that denies Social Security survivors’ benefits to 
deserving posthumously conceived children. As it stands, the Social 
Security Administration and many states seem behind the times in 
their current understanding of posthumously conceived children. As 
modern forms of conception continue to advance, it is essential that 
these administrative bodies advance with them. Otherwise, our country 
will have a large class of children who are discriminated against 
because of the timeline of their conception.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
  
Posthumously conceived children have suffered a significant 
setback with the decision in Capato v. Astrue. They may only receive 
Social Security survivors’ benefits if they live in a state that 
recognizes posthumously conceived children under its intestacy laws.  
These children have no choice in the timeline of their conception. 
However, due to advancements in reproductive technology, 
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 UPC §2-120(k) (2010) (noting that the 36 month period provides “the surviving 
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posthumously conceived children are a growing class in America.  
Congress must amend the Social Security Act to support them, 
consistent with the original purpose of the Act itself. Congress has 
even been handed a blueprint of a legislative amendment in the 
Uniform Probate Code, which includes provisions that create a 
balancing of the interests of posthumously conceived children with an 
efficient administration of inheritance law. It is important for 
Congressional leaders to act promptly to bring posthumously 
conceived children within the protective scope of the Social Security 
Act.  
 
